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Reassessing Rule 11 and 
Civil Rights Cases 
CARL TOBIAS 
The Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules amended Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule 11) in August 1983 because of increa5-
ing concern about attorney abuses in civil lawsuits and about the so-
called litigation explosion. The revision commands courts to sanction 
lawyers and parties who do not undertake reasonable prefiling inquir-
ies.1 The Committee, in its Advisory Committee Note which accom-
panied promulgation of the amendment, expressly stated that the 
"rule is not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in 
pursuing factual or legal theories."2 Certain aspects of the new ver-
sion's implementation provoked substantial controversy which contin-
ued virtually undiminished from the amendment's August 1983 
effective date at least until the fifth anniversary of its adoption. Per-
haps most controversial was the question whether courts' application 
inhibited the pursuit of legitimate litigation, especially cases involving 
civil rights claims. 3 Critics of Rule 11 contended that excessive, ex-
pensive and unnecessary satellite litigation engendered by the new pro-
vision, the amendment's inconsistent judicial enforcement, and its 
vigorous application against civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers disad-
vantaged and had a chilling effect on these parties and practitioners.4 
I. See FED. R. C1v. P. 11. I do not address the amendment's proscription upon papers 
filed for improper purposes because few courts have depended on it to sanction and because its 
invocation has less potential for chilling valid litigation. 
2. See FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note 97 F.R.D. 165, 199 (1983). "Chill" 
in this context, is derived from the "Chilling Effect Doctrine," which states "any law or practice 
which has the effect of seriously discouraging the exercise of a constitutional right." Black's Law 
Dictionary 217 (5th ed. 1979). 
3. Civil rights litigation is a case which pursues the vindication of interests of many per-
sons in enforcing mandates and values implicating civil rights found in federal civil rights stat-
utes and the constitution. A typical example is litigation brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. 
Cf. S. Burbank, Rule I I in Transition: The Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on Federal 
Rule of Procedure JI (1989 AM. JUDICATURE Soc'y 68,71) (helpful discussion of "civil rights 
cases"). 
4. Satellite litigation unrelated to the merits of lawsuits, such as that seeking attorney's fees 
for alleged Rule n violations. Chilling effects are "improper" impacts resulting from the amend-
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The possibility that the revised version dampened the enthusiasm of 
civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers is an extremely controversial, but 
very important, issue because they seek to vindicate significant social 
values affecting many people, such as freedom from racial 
discrimination. 
A number of developments relating principally to apparent im-
provements in the amendment's judicial enforcement which have oc-
curred since approximately mid-1988 indicate that the rule may be 
causing those who bring civil rights cases less difficulty than was previ-
ously thought. The recent developments warrant close scrutiny, be-
cause they could leave the impression that Rule 11 no longer is 
problematic for civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys, and that impres-
sion may be inaccurate. 
The first section of this paper analyzes how the amendment ad-
versely affected civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers between August 1983 
and mid-1988. The second part reviews numerous subsequent devel-
opments that appear to constitute improvements for the litigants and 
attorneys. The assessment shows that some developments should en-
hance application but that others may not or are currently unclear and 
that additional problems remain. In short, it is impossible to discern 
whether the developments ultimately will suffice for civil rights plain-
tiffs and lawyers. The last section, therefore, offers suggestions for as-
certaining more conclusively what effects the rule is having in civil 
rights cases and for improving future judicial application. 
I. THE FIRST FIVE YEARS OF EXPERIENCE WITH RULE 11 
Numerous judges, writers and civil rights litigants and practition-
ers stated that Rule 11 posed many difficulties for those who pursued 
civil rights cases from the time it became effective in August 1983 until 
approximately the middle of 1988.5 The professors who performed 
ment's application, from limitations, such as resource constraints on civil right's plaintiffs, and 
from their suits' inherent characteristics, such as their comparative novelty, that discourage po-
tentially valid litigation. These parties and their lawyers are especially vulnerable to having their 
enthusiasm dampened because their lack of resources makes them risk adverse. All of these ideas 
are analyzed in Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 Buffalo L. Rev. 485, 495-98 
(1989). At the time I researched and wrote this recent article, I, too, found that Rule 11 was 
adversely affecting civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys. Developments that have occurred since 
then appear to be improvements for them and prompted me to write this new piece which ana-
lyzes whether the developments will suffice. 
5. The recent developments which appear to be improvements date roughly from mid-
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two thorough studi~ premised on reported Rule 11 opinions deter-
mined that sanctions were sought from and imposed on civil rights 
plaintiffs considerably more often than civil rights defendants and that 
those who brought civil rights cases were being sanctioned at a much 
greater rate than plaintiffs in any other kind of federal civil lawsuit. 6 
One of these analysts, other writers, and a few judges found that 
courts vigorously applied the rule's requirements regarding reasonable 
prefiling legal inquiries and factual investigations against civil rights 
plaintiffs and lawyers.7 The judicial decisions that they had violated 
the amendment apparently were more problematic for the parties and 
attorneys than the determinations actually awarding sanctions. 
Courts seemed to enforce the compulsory sanctions command less rig-
orously against the plaintiffs and practitioners while imposing a rela-
tively small number of substantial assessments on them. 8 
Nevertheless, the parties and attorneys still may have been adversely 
affected or chilled by certain aspects of sanctions decisionmaking. For 
example, judges' determinations to impose monetary sanctions in the 
overwhelming majority of situations, together with large awards in 
even a few civil rights cases, could have disadvantaged the litigants 
and lawyers. 9 
Concomitantly, there was considerable inconsistency in the 
amendment's application to numerous important questions. Judges 
disagreed substantially over the essential issue of what was required to 
satisfy the rule's reasonable prefiling inquiry commands, by, for in-
1988, although I do not adhere rigidly to that date in this piece. When I depart from it, I attempt 
to say so and afford an explanation. For a more thorough treatment of the ideas in this section, 
see Tobias, supra note 4, at 489-508. 
6. See Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in 
the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1327, 1340 (1986); 
Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.D.R. 189, 200-01 (1988). 
7. See Vairo, supra note 6, at 200-02, 205, 213-14, 217. Accord Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. 
Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1085 (7th Cir. 1987) (Cudahy, J., dissenting), cert. dismissed, 108 
S. Ct. 1101 (1988); La France, Federal Rule 11 and Public Interest Litigation, 22 Val. U.L. Rev. 
331 (1988); Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 Harv. L. 
Rev. 630, 635-37 (1987). See, e.g., Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1973; Rogers v. Lincoln Towing Service, 
771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985) (examples of vigorous application in both majority opinions). 
8. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 498-501. 
9. Id., at 501 n.58 "selection of the sanction with the greatest potential to be financially 
burdensome is not neutral, because it disproportionately affects and may [even chill] those with 
relatively few resources." Id. at 501 n.58. Correspondingly, inconsistent judicial application of 
the mandatory sanctions command and excessive, expensive satellite litigation over it have disad-
vantaged civil rights litigants. See infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. 
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stance, confusing the relative significance of that inquiry and the mer-
its. 10 Moreover, courts which found that parties had violated the 
amendment differed markedly, even in apparently similar factual cir-
cumstances, over the appropriate purpose, type and amount of the 
sanction to be imposed. 11 
Numerous observers remarked on the inconsistencies. An appel-
late judge, who believed a $53,000 sanction was proper and dissented 
from a majority opinion recognizing trial court discretion to impose an 
award as low as $10,000, criticized his colleagues for promoting incon-
sistency and arbitrariness in sanctions decisionmaking and for ignor-
ing the rule's important compensatory goal. 12 The individual who 
conducted a significant study of the amendment stated that by mid-
1986 the consensus in the circuit courts which had existed was begin-
ning to unravel, and she doubted whether the appellate courts would 
be able to "develop a coherent set of [R]ule 11 standards."13 Th(; per-
son who served as the Reporter for the Third Circuit Task Force on 
Rule 11 found that most of the circuits were in substantial disagree-
ment on many important issues involving the amendment. 14 
Closely related to inconsistent judicial application was the prob-
lem of excessive, unwarranted, expensive litigation over issues extrane-
ous to the substance of disputes, such as that implicating refined 
questions of the amendment's meaning. 15 For example, one judge as-
serted that the rule's technical, overzealous application by the other 
members of a circuit court panel would open new vistas for satellite 
10. See SANCTIONS: RULE 11 AND OTHER POWERS.18-19 (G. Joseph, P. Sandler and C. 
Shaffer 2d ed. 1988); Tobias, supra note 4, at 492-98. Szabo, 823 F.2d 1073, exemplifies judicial 
disagreement, while Greenberg v. Sala, 822 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1987), typifies confusion of 
the reasonable prefiling inquiry with the merits. 
11. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 498-501. The classic illustration is the litigation involving 
Eastway Construction Company and New York City, in which "disposition of sanctions ques-
tions required two district court decisions and three circuit court opinions in which the judges 
disagreed dramatically." Id. at 499 text accompanying note 50. 
12. See Eastway Constr. Co. v. City of New York, 821F.2d121, 124 (2d Cir. 1986) (Pratt, 
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987). 
13. See Vairo, supra note 6, at 205. Accord Sanctions, supra note 10, at 14-16, 24-25. 
14. See Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil procedure: The Example of Rule 
11, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1925, 1930-31 (1989). Professor Burbank was not speaking in his capacity 
as Reporter, however. 
15. The Eastway litigation is a classic example in the context of sanctions decisionmaking 
generally and disputes over the propriety of specific awards levied. See supra note 11. Cf. 
Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1540 (9th Cir. 1986) (requesting 
courts to "grade accuracy of advocacy" of each paper filed increases judicial determinations and 
parties' expenses). 
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litigation. 16 A district judge stated in 1987 that he would not be "sur-
prised if shortly the Rule 11 tail were wagging the substantive law dog 
in many cases." 17 
In short, all of these developments detrimentally and even dispro-
portionately affected civil rights plaintiffs and practitioners. One sig-
nificant example not yet mentioned is that vigorous application of the 
rule's reasonable prefiling factual investigation mandate apparently 
had the effect of imposing more stringent pleading requirements on 
civil rights plaintiffs, if only to counter sanctions motions. 18 Perhaps 
most important, these parties' and lawyers' lack of resources makes 
them especially susceptible to having their enthusiasm for litigation 
dampened by the type of judicial enforcement reviewed. 
It is highly controversial, however, whether courts' application 
actually had chilling effects on civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys. 
Considerable information suggests that such an effect was experienced 
between August 1983 and mid-1988. 19 One judge feared that too vig-
orous or rigid enforcement of the rule would have "chilling effects" 
that "reach as tellingly to the most meritorious [civil rights] claim as 
to the least."20 A few courts in the context of civil rights cases voiced 
more general concerns that Rule 11 's application might chill the en-
thusiasm and creativity of attorneys. 21 A small number of judges 
urged that the amendment be implemented cautiously in civil rights 
litigation, seemingly worried about the possibility of such an effect. 22 
Individuals who prepared several thorough assessments of the 
rule substantially agreed with what the courts said and offered addi-
tional observations.23 For example, one evaluator asserted that the 
"statistics gleaned from the reported cases-which show a dramatic 
16. See Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1085-86. He added that the majority's "nitpicking approach 
[was] not unlike the grading oflaw school examinations." Id. at 1086. 
17. See Yancey v. Carroll County, 674 F. Supp. 572, 575 (E.D. Ky. 1987). 
18. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 494 notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
19. For more thorough treatment of chilling effects, see id. at 503-06. 
20. See Sazbo, 823 F.2d at 1086 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). 
21. See, e.g., Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d, 463, 468 (4th Cir. 1987) (Butzner, J., dissenting); 
Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1561 (11th Cir. 1987). These were civil rights suits, but the 
courts seemed to be invoking the more general concern regarding chilling in the advisory com-
mittee note. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
22. See, e.g., Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1085-86 (Cudahy, J., dissenting); Yancey, 674 F. Supp. at 
575. 
23. See Sanctions, supra note 10; Nelken, supra note 6; Vairo, supra note 6. The first source 
did not expressly assess civil rights suits; however, it did cite to many such cases. 
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impact on plaintiffs in [civil rights] cases-seem to justify" opponents' 
concerns that the amendment "would 'chill' vigorous advocacy."24 
She also stated that it was impossible to ascertain the number of meri-
torious claims that had not been pursued out of fear of the amend-
ment.25 Moreover, civil rights lawyers' belief that they were the 
"primary victims of Rule 1 l " 26 and the significant amount of anecdo-
tal information involving threats to sanction the attorneys27 strongly 
indicate that judicial enforcement could have a chilling effect on them 
and their clients. 
All of the observations are consistent with plausible inferences 
regarding the chilling effect that could be drawn from courts' applica-
tion between the rule's effective date and the middle of 1988.28 Nu-
merous considerations, such as fear about large sanctions awards or 
the costs of satellite litigation, can discourage potential litigants from 
instituting cases or impair their vigorous pursuit of litigation begun. 
The factors and additional difficulties can prevent civil rights practi-
tioners from attempting to vindicate new or unpopular legal theories 
or from being sufficiently zealous advocates, and the attorneys may 
refuse to take on clients whose cases demand legal or factual 
elaboration. 
II. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE Mm-1988 
Since approximately the mid-point of 1988, there have been nu-
merous developments which suggest that the amendment may be less 
problematic for civil rights plaintiffs and practitioners than it was dur-
ing the first half-decade of implementation. The developments as-
sessed are not intended to be a comprehensive catalog, but focus on 
events most significant to these litigants and attorneys. 
24. See Vairo, supra note 6, at 200. Cf. Nelken, supra note 6, at 1339 (concerns regarding 
chilling expressed before amendment's promulgation were well-founded). 
25. See Vairo, supra note 6, at 201. Cf. Yancey, 674 F. Supp. at 575 (significant, "unanswer-
able question" is how much legitimate litigation is being chilled. The co-editor of Sanctions, 
supra note 10, at 2, stated more generally that chilling of lawyers' creativity or enthusiasm in 
pursuing theories of law had occurred. Moreover, writers argued that civil rights lawyers and 
litigants had experienced chilling. See LaFrance, supra note 7, at 353; Note, supra note 7, at 631. 
26. See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 871 n.4 (5th Cir. 1988) (quotation 
extracted from document prepared in connection with projected rule 11 study by Center for 
Constitutional Rights). 
27. The anecdotal information is derived from discussions with civil rights and public inter-
est attorneys. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 502 n.61, 505 n.73 and accompanying text. 
28. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 505-06 notes 74-76 and accompanying text. 
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A. Judicial Application 
Relatively recent developments pertaining to certain aspects of 
the rule's judicial application could constitute improvements for those 
who pursue civil rights suits. A few appellate court panels have over-
turned trial judges' determinations that civil rights plaintiffs had con-
travened Rule 11, explicitly stating that the imposition of sanctions 
could have had a chilling effect. 29 
A growing number of courts have evidenced particular concern 
for the needs of civil rights litigants and lawyers. For example, the 
Eleventh Circuit has accorded considerable deference to district 
judges' decisions that civil rights plaintiffs were not in violation of the 
amendment, 30 while numerous trial courts have refused to sanction 
civil rights plaintiffs who appeared to have relatively weak cases.31 
Quite a few judges have stated that Rule 11 should not be employed to 
deter unpopular or controversial litigation, although these pronounce-
ments infrequently have been in civil rights cases. 32 
Many courts, primarily in suits not involving civil rights, have 
recognized numerous specific problems with the amendment's applica-
tion and have attempted to ameliorate or to remedy the difficulties or 
offered cogent suggestions for doing so. 33 For instance, a number of 
judges have admonished litigants and lawyers not to invoke Rule 11 
routinely; have stated that it is to be reserved for exceptional circum-
stances, or have observed that only litigation abuse or assertions of 
29. See Davis v. Crush, 862 F.2d 84, 92 (6th Cir. 1988); Woodrum v. Woodward County, 
Oklahoma, 866 F.2d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1989). Cf Greenberg v. Hilton Int') Co., 870 F.2d 926, 
935 (2d Cir. 1989) (rejecting amendment's rigorous enforcement in employment discrimination 
suit because of possibility of chilling potentially viable cases). Accord Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. 
of America, 861 F.2d 746, 760 (1st Cir. 1988). See also O'Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 F.2d 
1465, 1476 (10th Cir. 1989) (reversing on merits and vacating sanctions' imposition). 
30. See O'Neal v. DeKalb County, Ga., 850 F.2d 653, 658 (11th Cir. 1988); Rolleston v. 
Eldridge, 848 F.2d 163 (11th Cir. 1988). Accord Tabrizi v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 883 F.2d 587, 
593 (7th Cir. 1989); New Alaska Development Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1306 (9th 
Cir. 1989). 
31. See, e.g., Summer v. Fuller, 718 F. Supp. 1523, 1525 (N.D. Ga. 1989); Goldberg v. Weil, 
707 F. Supp. 357, 362 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Gordon v. Hercules, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Kan. 
1989); Pickens v. Children's Mercy Hospital, 124 F.R.D. 209, 211 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Jones v. 
Deutsch, 715 F. Supp. 1237, 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Smith v. Philadelphia School Dist., 679 F. 
Supp. 479, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1988). Of course, this implicates the merits which should be deem-
phasized in comparison to the prefiling inquiry. 
32. See, e.g., Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Federal Agents, 855 F.2d 1080, 1091 
(3d Cir. 1988); Thomas, 836 F.2d at 877. 
33. The judicial application examined is tailored narrowly to civil rights litigation. For 
somewhat broader treatment, see Tobias, supra note 4, at 518-22. 
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patently unmeritorious claims should be considered to violate the 
amendment. 34 
Correspondingly, some courts when determining what mandatory 
sanctions are most appropriate have seriously considered non-mone-
tary alternatives or made violators' ability to pay relevant to imposi-
tion of that form of sanction or to monetary assessments. 35 Many 
judges also have enforced Rule 11 in a number of additional ways that 
might be advantageous for civil rights plaintiffs and practitioners. 36 
In short, these judicial approaches to the amendment's applica-
tion, especially insofar as they limit inconsistent enforcement and ex-
pensive satellite litigation, could prove beneficial to civil rights 
litigants and attorneys and even reduce potential chilling. Critical 
analysis of these developments in the courts which seem to be im-
provements show, however, that some are problematic in certain ways, 
while there remain other difficulties relating to Rule 11. 
One important problem with these recent developments is that 
numerous apparent improvements are pronouncements, while others 
are recommendations for enforcing the amendment that have actually 
been applied in relatively few civil rights cases. The statements and 
suggestions are helpful, but the ideas must in fact be applied carefully 
and systematically in civil rights actions. There exist, accordingly, 
complex questions of clarity, of translation and of transferability, 
among others. Indeed, authors of some of the finest Rule 11 opinions, 
while recognizing that reasonableness of prefiling inquiries was the 
central question in determining if the amendment had been violated, 
seemed to emphasize the merits or the quality of the papers. 37 
34. The Third Circuit has subscribed the most to these propositions. See, e.g., Mary Ann 
Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 99 (3d Cir. 1988); Teamsters Local Union No. 430 v. 
Cement Express, Inc., 841 F.2d 66, 68 (3d Cir. 1988). For a recent articulation which cites to 
numerous opinions rendered by courts outside the Third Circuit, see Doering v. Union County 
Board of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 1988). 
35. See, e.g., Doering, 857 F.2d at 195-97; Thomas, 836 F.2d at 876-81. Cf. Morrison v. 
Lipscomb, 877 F.2d 463, 469 (6th Cir. 1989) (award of attorney's fee against losing civil rights 
plaintiff is "extreme sanction" limited to truly egregious misconduct); Tobias, supra note 4, at 
521 n.137 (cases stating that "reasonable fees" need not be those actually incurred and that 
parties' who move for sanctions have duty to mitigate expenses). 
36. For instance, the Fifth Circuit in Thomas, 836 F.2d at 866, rendered an en bane decision 
to give district courts, in that circuit, guidance on a broad range of Rule 11 issues. Cf. Mars Steel 
Corp. v. Continental Bank, 880 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1989) (en bane decision to give guidance; 
especially on standard of appellate review of Rule 11 determinations). 
37. See, e.g., Napier, 885 F.2d at 1091 (characterizing claims as "legally frivolous"). For 
earlier examples, see Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 485 (3d Cir. 1989); Greenberg v. 
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Moreover, it is exceedingly difficult to premise accurate conclu-
sions about whether the rule's enforcement actually has improved, 
much less about potential chilling effects, on apparent improvements 
in national judicial application derived primarily from the compara-
tively small number of opinions available. 38 Marked differences in 
such considerations as local legal cultures and judges' attitudes toward 
the amendment mean that there is likely to be substantial variation in 
Rule 11 activity and application nationwide. 39 
Recent statistics indicate that as many as 90 percent of sanctioned 
dispositions may not appear in the federal reporter system, while fewer 
than four in ten are available through computerized reporting services, 
namely Lexis and Westlaw.40 There are disparities in publication 
practices which can even vary from case to case for individual mem-
bers of the judiciary. The decision to publish a Rule 11 opinion can be 
premised on factors which range from the desire to clarify ambiguity 
in the rule's interpretation to the wish to punish the lawyer in viola-
tion or to deter other attorneys who might be disposed to engage in 
similar behavior.41 Correspondingly, what appears on the face of an 
opinion may be primarily for public consumption, as when its author 
assembles or characterizes the facts in ways that support the result 
reached.42 
Certain of these considerations are crucial to ascertaining 
whether judicial application has improved, or chilling effects have 
been experienced, because considerable Rule 11 activity, and much 
which is said to disadvantage civil rights plaintiffs, such as threats to 
impose sanctions, are informal.43 Should these significant obstacles be 
Sala, 822 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1987). For more discussion of questions involving clarity, 
translation and transferability, see Tobias, supra note 4, at 510-17. 
38. I rely substantially in this paragraph on S. Burbank, supra note 3, although the recently 
completed rule 11 study conducted under the auspices of the Federal Judicial Center also pro-
vides much helpful pertinent information. See T. Willging, The Rule 11 Sanctioning Process 
(Federal Judicial Center 1988). 
39. See S. Burbank, supra note 3, at 406, 96-97. Accord T. Willging, supra note 38, at 179-
89. 
40. See S. Burbank, supra note 3, at 59, 98-99. 
41. These roughly mirror the rule's purposes. For thorough discussion of the purposes and 
a valuable attempt at clarification, see Thomas, 836 F.2d at 876-81. 
42. See Nelken, supra note 6, at 1339-40. For more discussion of difficulties entailed in 
relying on opinions available through the federal reporter system and computerized services, see 
S. Burbank, supra note 3, at 4-6, 44-45, 97; Ne/ken, supra, at 1339-40. 
43. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 501-03. 
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overcome, there still would be complications entailed in detecting liti-
gants' motivations and problems of measurement, among others. For 
instance, it is extremely difficult to discern why those who contemplate 
suit decide to forgo litigation, while the enthusiasm of some who con-
sider filing or choose to sue may be chilled as substantially by the pros-
pect of expensive, unwarranted satellite litigation as by actual 
imposition of sanctions.44 
Even were it possible to reach more definitive conclusions about 
whether the apparent improvements in judicial application examined 
will suffice, there remain other difficulties with the rule which could 
disadvantage and chill those who bring civil rights cases. Since mid-
1988, the number of Rule 11 motions filed against civil rights plaintiffs 
apparently has remained comparatively constant and the percentage of 
motions granted seems to have declined somewhat.45 During that pe-
riod, the civil rights bar's concern about the rule and its chilling effects 
may well have intensified, while at the same time, numerous courts 
evinced relatively little solicitude for civil rights litigants and practi-
tioners. 46 There are additional indicators of application that could be 
detrimental for the parties and attorneys. For instance, one judge re-
cently imposed a sanction of more than $1,000,000 against a non-
profit legal organization. A clear majority of courts continues to rely 
on monetary assessments as the sanction of choice and a Seventh Cir-
cuit panel proclaimed that Rule 11 is a fee-shifting statute. 47 
44. Chilling again implicates resource difficulties mentioned supra note 4. Indeed, civil 
rights litigants' "lack of resources means that the actual assessment of sizeable sanctions may be 
only marginally more discouraging than the threat of imposition." Tobias, supra note 4, at 501 
n.57. 
45. These assertions are premised on an impressionistic survey of Rule 11 activity by me 
research assistants and me. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 491 n.20. They also are premised on 
assessments made by the person who conducted the most significant study of reported Rule 11 
activity. See Telephone conversation with Professor Georgene Vairo, Fordham University, 
School of Law (Mar. 14, 1989. 
46. The assertion as to the civil rights bar is premised on conversations with civil rights and 
public interest lawyers. Indeed, civil rights attorneys are "screaming more than ever," while 
several civil rights lawyers have been devoting nearly all of their time to appealing Rule 11 
motions they allege were improperly granted. Telephone conversation with Professor George 
Cochran, University of Mississippi, School of Law (April 4, 1989). For a recent case evincing 
little solicitude, see Robeson Defense Committee v. Britt, - F. Supp. - (E.D.N.C. Sept. 29, 
1989). 
47. See Avirgan v. Hull, 691 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D. Fla. 1988), appeal.filed, No. 89-5143 (11th 
Cir. 1989) ($1,000,000 sanction); Telephone conversation, supra notes 45, 46 (monetary sane· 
tions' high incidence); Hays v. Sony Corp., 847 F.2d 412, 419-20 (7th Cir. 1988) (Rule 11 is fee 
shifting statute); but cf. Mars Steel, 880 F.2d at 932 ("Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting statute in the 
sense that the loser pays"). 
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In short, the recent developments relating to Rule 11 in the 
courts eventually may represent significant improvements for civil 
rights plaintiffs and practitioners. Nonetheless, some are problematic, 
while there remain additional difficulties with the amendment, so that 
there is currently a mixed picture. Similarly, several other develop-
ments which could be promising prove equally inconclusive when 
closely analyzed. 
B. Judge Schwarzer's Commentary 
A number of judges, when enforcing the amendment, look for 
guidance to United States District Judge William Schwarzer. He 
wrote a very influential article which included helpful recommenda-
tions for implementing the rule and urged that it be applied strictly in 
1985. The Judge has vigorously enforced the amendment since 
1983.48 His relatively recent Commentary on Rule 11 in the Harvard 
Law Review, which is already being cited by numerous judges, de-
serves attention particularly because he has been such a staunch pro-
ponent of the amendment's stringent implementation.49 
Judge Schwarzer acknowledged that courts' inconsistent enforce-
ment between the amendment's effective date and early 1988 had pro-
moted unpredictability. This lack of predictability, and lawyers' use of 
the rule for tactical purposes, as well as to recover attorney's fees, has 
generated excessive satellite litigation. 50 He suggested that courts shift 
their focus from the merits of disputes to the reasonableness of prefil-
ing inquiries in treating sanctions motions.51 Judge Schwarzer recom-
mended as well that judges deter abuse of the rule's principal purpose 
and, concomitantly, de-emphasize its compensatory aspects, particu-
larly by limiting fee shifting when imposing sanctions. 52 
If courts were to implement these ideas effectively and augment 
them, especially by considering central to Rule 11 decisionmaking, 
certain factors important to civil rights plaintiffs, such as their re-
48. See Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 
181 (1985). That piece has been widely cited by federal judges. 
49. See Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited (Commentary), 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1013 (1988) [here-
inaner Commentary]. For recent examples citing to it, see Mars Steel, 880 F.2d at 936; Doering, 
857 F.2d at 194. 
50. See Commentary, supra note 49, at 1015-18. 
51. See id. at 1021. 
52. See id. at 1019-21. 
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source constraints, the suggestions ultimately could enhance applica-
tion for the litigants and perhaps decrease potential chilling. 53 
However, considerably more courts must subscribe to these concepts, 
implement them with much greater facility, and evidence more appre-
ciation of the subtleties involved than have thus far.54 In the near 
term, therefore, significant advantages for those who bring civil rights 
cases are unlikely to accrue. 
Judge Schwarzer also observed that, although the amendment's 
unpredictable enforcement could lead to chilling, "lawyers should 
have little to fear in light of the type of conduct that courts have pun-
ished [and my] own experience has disclosed no anecdotal evidence of 
chilling."55 The statement that attorneys should not be concerned is 
less than reassuring, given the inconsistent judicial application of the 
rule's reasonable prefiling inquiry and mandatory sanctioning require-
ments. As to Judge Schwarzer's assertion that he has witnessed no 
chilling, it is unclear why a federal judge, who vigorously advocates 
the amendment's strict enforcement, would detect any evidence of 
chilling. 56 Therefore, Judge Schwarzer's inability to discern chilling is 
not dispositive; however, there has been considerable anecdotal evi-
dence of chilling which apparently has not decreased since the publica-
tion of his Commentary. 57 
C. Recent Studies 
1. Federal Judicial Center Study 
T.E. Willging recently completed a Rule 11 study, premised pri-
marily on interviews with thirty-six judges and sixty lawyers, under 
the auspices of the Federal Judicial Center. 58 The assessment found 
relatively few problems with the amendment and anticipated even less 
in the future, now that the half-decade "shakeout" period prescribed 
53. For more treatment of the factors that I argue courts should consider in Rule 11 deci-
sionmaking, see Tobias, supra note 4, at 495-98, 513-525. 
54. For a sense of the difficulties entailed, see Tobias, supra, at 510-17. 
55. See Commentary, supra note 49, at 1017. 
56. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 508-10. 
57. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 503-506. See generally supra notes 45-47 and accompanying 
text. 
58. See T. Willging, supra note 38. Although the study bears a 1988 publication date, it was 
only released to the public in March 1989. 
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by the Advisory Committee's Reporter has passed. 59 Certain informa-
tion reported in the study could prove problematic for civil rights 
plaintiffs and attorneys, while much of that data has ambiguous impli-
cations for them. 
Willging detected too little evidence of inconsistent judicial appli-
cation to warrant much concern, because the initial time for adjust-
ment has ended, a "consensus has evolved as to the general framework 
for applying Rule 11," and a "relatively clear set of doctrinal stan-
dards has begun to emerge."60 He did remark that "challenges arise 
. . . in defining the conduct that is required to satisfy the objective 
certification requirements of the rule: What is a 'reasonable inquiry' 
into the legal and factual basis of a claim?"61 Of course, this is the 
very question that lawyers must address before filing papers and that 
judges must resolve in ascertaining whether the amendment has been 
violated, the issue over which courts have disagreed so substantially. 
Willging also determined that there was minimal unnecessary satellite 
litigation, claiming that it was not the problem suggested by published 
opinions or by the literature. 62 
He found little evidence that "sanctions have a chilling effect on 
creative advocacy or unpopular causes" or on civil rights litigants 
while stating that "judicial reformulations of the standards for testing 
the adequacy of legal inquiry ... appear faithful to the Advisory Com-
mittee's concern about chilling effects."63 Willging criticized those 
who have "concluded that there is statistical evidence of dispropor-
tionate sanctioning of plaintiffs' attorneys in civil rights cases. "64 
The evaluator did acknowledge that statistical methodology is un-
likely to detect chilling effects in public interest litigation and that chil-
ling may be greater in public interest lawsuits while observing that 
policymakers will "have to rely on systematically collected and docu-
mented anecdotal evidence for further testing of the chilling-effect hy-
59. See id. at 40 n.65 (citations omitted). Professor Arthur Miller was the Reporter when 
rule 11 was amended. See Miller & Culp, Litigation Costs, Delay Promoted the New Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Nat'! L.J., Nov. 28, 1983, at 23. 
60. See T. Willging, supra note 38, at 39-42. 
61. Id. at 42-43. 
62. See id. at 108-12. 
63. Id. at 8-10, 44. 
64. See id. at 10, 160-63. He stated that the studies lack baseline data and fail to take into 
account the comparatively heightened risk of incurring sanctions in civil rights cases as opposed, 
for example, to ordinary contract or student loan repayment litigation. 
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pothesis."65 Willging found that monetary sanctions were imposed by 
the overwhelming majority of judges, 66 and he recommended that 
courts exercise caution in sanctioning "attorneys for indigent clients or 
in pro bono cases unless the frivolity is clearly the fault of the law-
yer. " 67 Furthermore, Willging stated that judges and lawyers have 
"reserved final judgment about the perceptions and realities of general 
and specific chilling effects, about the tendency of Rule 11 to generate 
satellite litigation . . . and about the relative lack of clear standards 
and procedures to guard against abuses. " 68 
2. Third Circuit Task Force Report on Rule 11 
The Third Circuit Task Force recently finished a study of all rule 
11 activity within its geographic purview for the period from July l, 
1987 to June 30, 1988.69 The Task Force cautioned against relying too 
substantially on any particular year's worth of information drawn 
from one circuit, especially a circuit which has indicated that the 
amendment is to be reserved for exceptional circumstances. 70 The 
ideas in the Task Force Report deserve respect, because the study is 
the first assessment to be based on systematically collected empirical 
evidence. The Task Force made some recommendations for the future 
and afforded numerous instructive insights which implicate concerns 
of civil rights plaintiffs and practitioners. 
It stated that satellite litigation involving the amendment appar-
ently was creating little significant difficulty for trial courts or liti-
gants. 71 Moreover, the Task Force rejected the propositions that the 
rule was a "cottage industry or that Rule 11 motions [were] routine in 
the Third Circuit" even in civil rights cases.72 It also observed that the 
65. See id. at 168. 
66. See id. at 530. 
67. Id. at 166. 
68. Id. at 174. 
69. See S. Burbank, supra note 3. I realize that the data underlying the study apply to the 
period before mid-1988. However, numerous ideas relevant to civil rights litigation in the Report 
are premised on relatively recent guidance from the Third Circuit indicating that the rule's appli-
cation is to be limited sharply. Moreover, the assessment was only made public quite recently. 
70. It warned of different local legal cultures and judicial viewpoints on rule 11 and the 
hazards of relying on reported opinions. See S. Burbank, supra note 3, at 4-6. Indeed it "would 
not predict what a similar task force would find in three years" even in the Third Circuit, See id. 
at 95. 
71. See id. at 77, 83. 
72. See id. at 95. 
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possibility of chilling parties' and lawyers' enthusiasm in the circuit 
did not "warrant serious concern."73 
However, the Task Force did find that civil rights plaintiffs and 
attorneys were sanctioned at significant rates, percentages approximat-
ing those detected in the studies mentioned above.74 Moreover, the 
Task Force remarked that it shared certain concerns of civil rights 
practitioners. 75 The Task Force maintained that congressional enact-
ment of fee-shifting legislation, such as the Civil Rights Attorneys' 
Fees Award Act of 1976, which was meant to guarantee the availabil-
ity of a competent pool of lawyers for civil rights plaintiffs, constituted 
an independent ground for applying amended Rule 11 sparingly, par-
ticularly to compensate, against those attorneys. 76 Furthermore, it 
suggested that greater attention be focused on whether the rule's en-
forcement is having a disproportionately adverse impact on indigent 
persons.77 
D. Miscellaneous Developments 
Considerable evidence is accumulating that litigants and practi-
tioners have exercised greater restraint in invoking amended Rule 11 
since mid-1988.78 For example, a growing number of law firms now 
requires attorneys to secure the approval of the litigation section or the 
permission of the firm management committee before filing sanctions 
motions. Correspondingly, some lawyers are counseling their clients 
to weigh seriously the costs and benefits of seeking sanctions, while 
clients are exhibiting more caution. 
In sum, there have been numerous recent developments, espe-
cially in the courts, relating to amended Rule 11 that could represent 
73. See id. at 84. 
74. See id. at 69 (47% rate). Cf. Vairo, supra note 6, at 200-01 (71 % rate). The Task 
Force's "sanction survey reveal[ed] similar results" to earlier studies of Nelken and Vairo, supra 
note 6, finding that the "sanctions imposed in reported cases are usually monetary, and they 
usually require payment to another party." It was "surprised by that finding [because] the Third 
Circuit has repeatedly emphasized the availability of non-monetary sanctions." S. Burbank, 
supra note 3, at 37. 
75. I was particularly concerned that "lower federal courts ... not lightly add sanctions to 
dismissal for those who seek to expand our horizons." S. Burbank, supra note 3, at 72. For 
additional concerns, see id. at 68-72. 
76. See S. Burbank, supra note 3, at 72. The Fees Act is 42 U.S.C. section 1988 (1982). 
77. See S. Burbank, supra note 3, at 72, 98. 
78. These assertions are premised on conversations with attorneys in numerous cities 
around the country. 
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improvements for civil rights plaintiffs and practitioners. Nonetheless, 
certain of the developments are problematic for the parties and law-
yers, while a number of difficulties with the amendment remain. What 
these considerations portend for the future is examined next. 
Ill. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
A. Lessons 
The selective survey of the more than six years of experience with 
Rule 11 above, especially the relatively recent developments and the 
complications that remain, yields numerous lessons. The clearest 
ideas which emerge from the review are how little we actually know 
about the amendment's enforcement in civil rights cases and its poten-
tial chilling effects on civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys. Moreover, 
what we purport to know is confusing and even contradictory as well 
as based on minimal data or on information that is limited temporally, 
geographically or in scope. Caution also is warranted in concluding 
too readily that the recent developments will constitute meaningful 
improvements for civil rights litigants and lawyers or mean that they 
are experiencing no chilling effects. 
Given the importance of civil rights litigation in American soci-
ety, there are compelling needs to know more about, and to enhance 
understanding of, the amendment's application in civil rights cases. 
We must undertake efforts to resolve the controversial question of 
whether Rule 11 is quelling the enthusiasm of civil rights plaintiffs and 
attorneys or at least to develop a more refined appreciation of judicial 
enforcement's consequences for those who bring civil rights actions. 
B. Reassessing Rule 11 
Although the recent developments relating to the amendment 
surveyed in the second section of this paper are checkered, they do 
lead me to be less pessimistic than before and to moderate somewhat 
my earlier recommendations. 79 I suggested that Congress, the 
Supreme Court and the Advisory Committee seriously consider Rule 
1l's expeditious repeal or amendment or that federal courts at least 
severely curtail the rule's enforcement. 80 Those recommendations 
79. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 513-25. 
80. See id. at 106-11, 148-49 and accompanying text. 
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were premised on analysis of the costs and benefits of continued broad 
application indicating that the disadvantages, especially for civil rights 
litigants, were substantially greater than the advantages, particularly 
in terms of deterring an indeterminate quantity of litigation abuse.81 
Certain recent judicial developments illustrating, for example, that the 
rule can be applied in ways more solicitous of civil rights litigants or 
that satellite litigation may be less problematic than before make con-
ceivable improved judicial enforcement. Thus, while it may not yet be 
time to declare that Rule 11 's amendment has been a failed experi-
ment, it surely would be premature to characterize the new version as 
a success. 
As a practical matter, Congress, the Court, and the Advisory 
Committee appear unlikely in the near future to repeal or amend Rule 
11.82 Neither Congress nor the Committee has evinced substantial in-
terest in altering the rule, although both entities should seriously con-
sider the possibility or at least thoroughly investigate it. 83 Moreover, 
the assembly, assessment, and synthesis of additional data, especially if 
that information clearly shows that the amendment is chilling or seri-
ously disadvantaging civil rights plaintiffs and practitioners, may con-
vince these decisionmakers that change is warranted. 
C. Studies 
Some of this work, especially ascertaining chilling effects with 
sufficient accuracy, is very difficult to do. There are problems of defi-
nition, detection, and measurement because chilling effects themselves 
are intangible and amorphous. For instance, it is difficult to ascertain 
precisely what constitute warnings that lawyers might be contravening 
Rule 11; warnings are proper and may be fair for courts and litigants 
by giving notice that a violation is about to occur and by reducing 
81. See id. at 513-17, 522-25. 
82. This is especially true, now that the five year "shakeout" period has passed. See supra 
note 60 and accompanying text. For a critical assessment of the rule revision procedures, finding 
them inadequate for contemporary needs, see Lewis, the Excessive History of Federal Rule 15(c) 
and Its Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 85 Mich. L. REv. 1057 (1989). 
83. The Committee, through the Judicial Conference, has supported a number of assess-
ments of the rules, such as the new study conducted by T. Willging, examined supra noted 58-68 
and accompanying text. Moreover, it has evinced somewhat greater interest recently in possible 
amendment. See, e.g .. Letter from Judge Joseph Weis, Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules 
of Practice from Procedure to Carl Tobias (Aug. 9, 1989); Letter from Professor Paul Car-
rington, Reporter, Advisory Committee to Carl Tobias (Aug. 7, 1989) (on file with author). 
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sanctions' potential size. It is even harder to distinguish warnings 
from threats to sanction the attorney which can be quite subtle and 
can be inappropriate, especially insofar as they reflect judicial dissatis-
faction with plaintiffs' determination to proceed with the merits. 84 
Correspondingly, it is equally problematic to discern why those who 
contemplate suit decide to forgo litigation or why parties who file cases 
choose to discontinue them as well as estimate the number of valid 
claims that never were pursued out of fear about Rule 11. 85 Neverthe-
less, much more can be accomplished in the future than has been. 
Although the complexity of the issues relating to chilling means that 
they may defy definitive resolution, it is possible to clarify the ques-
tions and to learn considerably more than currently is known about 
how the rule discourages civil rights litigants and practitioners. 
In the future, studies should be performed which are as rigorous 
and thorough as feasible, and that concentrate on what courts' en-
forcement means for civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys, especially in 
terms of the potential for reducing their enthusiasm. There must be 
systematic collection, analysis and synthesis of data in a sufficient 
number of geographic areas, with diverse enough legal cultures and 
judicial attitudes toward Rule 11, over adequate time to afford statisti-
cal validity. An attempt should be made to determine whether the 
high percentage of sanctions imposed on civil rights plaintiffs, found in 
two national studies of reported opinions and detected by the Third 
Circuit Task Force, is representative.86 There should be efforts to as-
certain exactly what number of sanctions motions are being lodged 
against civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers, precisely how much informal 
Rule 11 activity of what type, including sanctions, threats and warn-
ings, involves them, and the specific amount of inconsistent applica-
tion and satellite litigation that exists. Once these are determined, 
their implications, especially in terms of chilling effects, for civil rights 
litigants and attorneys should be calculated. Crucially important to 
some of these determinations will be assembling and documenting sys-
84. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 501-02. 
85. See supra notes 25, 44 and accompanying text. Two members of the Illinois bar recently 
observed that "we cannot count the number of unfiled cases that would have been brought had 
rule 11 not been amended, much less can we judge their merit." Elson & Rothchild, Rule 11: 
Objectivity and Competence, 123 F.R.D. 361, 365 (1989). 
86. See Nelken, supra note 6, at 1327; Vairo, supra note 6, at 200-01; S. Burbank, supra note 
3, at 69. 
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tematically anecdotal evidence of Rule 11 activity that has potential 
chilling effects, especially by seeking the viewpoints of individuals and 
lawyers who actually consider bringing and in fact do pursue civil 
rights cases. 
The Third Circuit Task Force affords many helpful suggestions 
for conducting future studies, such as what litigation should count as a 
civil rights case, the risks of relying too greatly on reported opinions 
and what Rule 11 activity to assess in addition to those decisions and 
how to analyze it. 87 The Task Force also indicated that there was 
considerable need to evaluate sanctions activity in geographic areas 
where the practices of attorneys and courts' views on Rule 11 differ 
from those in the Third Circuit, such as the Seventh Circuit, several of 
whose members have indicated their intention to apply the amend-
ment vigorously. 88 Additional candidates might be areas in which 
lawyers aggressively file sanctions motions and some judges rigorously 
enforce Rule 11, such as the Southern District of New York or the 
Northern District of California. 89 Rural locales with potentially dif-
ferent legal cultures, such as the Rocky Mountains or sparsely popu-
lated sections of the Midwest or the South, also should be examined. 
The person who conducted the recent study sponsored by the Federal 
Judicial Center carefully premised his choice of certain districts for 
assessment on considerations, such as diversity while offering helpful 
suggestions for selecting appropriate study areas. 90 He also provided 
instructive insights on how to test the chilling effect hypothesis and 
valuable advice on interviewing judges and lawyers that should prove 
helpful in eliciting much information relevant to chilling.91 
87. See S. Burbank, supra note 3, at 4-6, 44-45, 68-72, 96-99. 
88. See id. at 59, 96-97, 99. The Task Force did not specifically recommend that circuit for 
study, although it did "suspect that ... the icebergs are larger in the Seventh Circuit and that one 
of them is colder." Id. at 59. Indications of intent to apply Rule 11 vigorously appear in Hays v. 
Sony, 847 F.2d at 419-20; Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1080-85; and Dreis & Krump Mfg. v. Int'l Ass'n of 
Machinists, 802 F.2d 247, 255 (7th Cir. 1986). Moreover, the four concurring judges in Mars 
Steel recognized the "wide-ranging implications that [R]ule 11 sanctions have had in the post-
1983 era for the practice oflaw in this circuit." See 880 F.2d at 940 (Flaum J.). Nonetheless, the 
majority opinion, apparently evinces moderating tendencies in that circuit, see id. at 932-36, as 
does opinions like Tabrizi, 883 F.2d 587. 
89. See T. Willging, supra note 38, at 179 (Southern District of New York and Northern 
District of Illinois had three times as many published Rule 11 opinions as the next closest 
districts). 
90. See id. at 179-89. 
91. See id. at 8-10, 15-19, 160-63, 168, 184-85. For valuable treatment of numerous difficul-
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D. Judicial Application 
While these studies are being conducted, judges requested to 
sanction civil rights litigants and lawyers should remember what has 
been said above, especially that their resource deficiencies make them 
risk averse and peculiarly susceptible to chilling, particularly by overly 
vigorous application of the rule. Courts should seriously consider se-
verely circumscribing enforcement because the costs of continued 
broad implementation still seem to outweigh the benefits. 92 Consider-
able recent work suggests that several of the rule's principal purposes, 
such as encouraging attorneys to stop and think before they file papers 
and limiting litigation abuse, have been substantially achieved or that 
these goals and others that have not yet been completely attained can 
be addressed at least as efficaciously with additional mechanisms, such 
as case management and civil contempt.93 Courts could significantly 
curtail application in numerous ways. They might follow the lead of 
several Third Circuit judges who have stated that the rule is to be 
reserved for extraordinary circumstances while limiting fee-shifting 
sanctions to outrageous abuses of the litigation process.94 
Those judges who think that the amount of attorney abuse war-
rants ongoing broad enforcement should keep in mind the needs of 
civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers and be responsive to them. The 
judges should remember the recent developments in the courts and 
other suggestions for improvements in judicial application and employ 
them when treating Rule 11 motions filed against those who bring civil 
rights cases.95 Helpful examples are Judge Schwarzer's recommenda-
tions: that the focus shift from the merits to prefiling inquiries' rea-
ties involved in attempting to collect and evaluate empirical information, see Marcus, Public Law 
Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 647, 686-91 (1988). 
92. I believe that courts should do so, because the costs remain too substantial, even though 
I have moderated somewhat my earlier views. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text. 
93. Recent work suggesting that several of the rule's major purposes are being achieved is S. 
Burbank, supra note 3, at 74, 96; T. Willging, supra note 38, at 11-12; Commentary, supra note 
48, at 1014-15. Recent work suggesting that certain purposes can be achieved at least as effica-
ciously with other mechanisms is Sanctions, supra note 10, at 2, 16, 24-25; Tobias, supra note 4, 
at 513-17; Vairo, supra note 6, at 233. 
94. For the Third Circuit jurisprudence, see supra note 34 and accompanying text. The 
suggestion regarding feeshifting is mine. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 517 n.124, 521 n.135 and 
accompanying text. I believe, however, that it approximates what Judge Schwarzer intended in 
his Commentary. Moreover, some courts have suggested as much. See, e.g., Doering, 857 F.2d 
at 194-97. 
95. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text. 
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sonableness, that deterrence of litigation abuse be integral to Rule 11, 
and that the amendment's compensatory purpose be de-emphasized.96 
Others include according serious consideration to nonmonetary sanc-
tions or making ability to pay central to imposing that alternative or to 
the size of monetary awards. Courts as well should develop new ap-
proaches to Rule 11 that are solicitous of civil rights plaintiffs and 
practitioners. 
CONCLUSION 
During the first five years of Rule 11 's existence, it adversely af-
fected civil rights litigants and attorneys and apparently had chilling 
effects on them. Some recent developments could constitute improve-
ments for these parties and lawyers and perhaps chill them less, 
although a number of the developments currently appear mixed, while 
certain problems remain. Whether what has happened actually will 
yield meaningful improvements for those who pursue civil rights 
claims, especially by reducing chilling, must await additional develop-
ments relating specifically to the recent and to future Rule 11 activity 
and its rigorous assessment. Most important will be how broad and 
effective developments have been, as well as careful judicial applica-
tion in civil rights cases. The extent of actual improvements, particu-
larly decreases in potential chilling, will not be clear until considerably 
more close scrutiny of the amendment has been completed. Such eval-
uation, which should rigorously analyze all relevant Rule 11 activity, 
especially that which is informal, ought to commence as soon as is 
feasible. While the assessments proceed, judges should carefully en-
force the rule in civil rights cases. 
96. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. Cf Tobias, supra note 4, at 517-25 (sug-
gestions for continued broad enforcement). 
